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INTRODUCTION
Since the mass protests in Iran in 2009 and the upheavals in the Middle East and
North Africa in 2011 and 2012, many scholars have sought to understand the role of
new media technologies in fueling grassroots social movements across the region.1
Previous attempts had been made to study the relationship between new information
communication technologies (ITCs) and political change.2 However, in 2009, prominent
Western media outlets hailed social media as a panacea for democratic reform, labeling
the post-election uprisings in Iran as the “Twitter Revolution”3—a notion that has been
challenged as vastly over-simplified.4

In 2009, prominent
Western media
hailed social media
as a panacea for
democratic reform,
labeling the postelection uprisings in
Iran as the “Twitter
Revolution”—a
notion that has been
challenged as vastly
over-simplified.

There is no doubt that social networking sites (SNSs) and new media
platforms have globalized communications: today, nearly one billion
users around the world use Facebook on a common platform. While this
has encouraged a plethora of research on new media technologies and
their impacts on state-society relations, there are still key gaps in our
knowledge and understanding about how these technologies are being
mobilized in, and shaped by, different cultural and political contexts.
Although social networking sites and online media in general are indeed
creating new modes of communication that can potentially foster social
and political change, it is unclear how and in what capacities these
platforms are being moblized to enhance civic participation in the public
sphere. As such, key questions remain over what role social media and
social networking technologies played, and are playing, in the democratization and political reform efforts in Iran or across the Middle East.

It is therefore necessary to examine more closely the national and regional dimensions
of new media use in order to better understand how users in different geographical
and political contexts are interacting with these platforms and their various features in
practice—particularly in societies in which media and communications are heavily state

1 Sean Aday et al., Blogs and Bullets:
New Media in Contentious Politics (Washington D.C.: Institute of Peace, 2010);
Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy: Information
Technology and Political Islam, Oxford
Studies in Digital Politics (Oxford ; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010);
Zeynep Tufekci and Christopher Wilson,
“Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations
From Tahrir Square,” Journal of Communication 62, no. 2 (2012): 363–379.
2 R. Kelly Garrett, “Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature
on Social Movements and New ICTs,” Information, Communication & Society 9, no.
2 (April 2006): 202–224; Patrick Meier,

“Do ‘Liberation Technologies’ Change the
Balance of Power between Repressive
States and Civil Society?” (PhD, Tuft
University, 2011); Wim van de Donk et al.,
eds., Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens,
and Social Movements (London ; New
York: Routledge, 2004).
3 See for example, “Editorial: Iran’s
Twitter revolution,” Washington Times,
June 16, 2009; Andrew Sullivan, “The
Revolution Will Be Twittered,” The
Atlantic, The Daily Dish, June 13, 2009;
Nathan Hodge, “Taking to the Streets —
and Tweets — in Tehran,” Wired, June 13,
2009; “Tweeting Iran: Elex news in 140
characters or less,” Associated Press, 15
June 2009.

4 Early critics of the “Twitter Revolution” include: Jack Shafer, “Doubting
Twitter: Let’s not get carried away about
its role in the Iranian demonstrations,”
Slate, June 17, 2009; Maximilian Forte,
“America’s Iranian Twitter Revolution,” Zero Anthropology, June 17, 2009;
Anne-Marie Corley, “The Web vs. The
Republic of Iran: Twitter gives Iranians a
voice, but the government still controls
the Internet,” MIT Technology Review,
June 18 2009; Evgeny Morozov, “Iran:
Downside to the ‘Twitter Revolution’,”
Dissent, Fall 2009; Malcolm Gladwell,
“Small Change: Why the Revolution
Will Not Be Tweeted,” The New Yorker,
October 4, 2010.
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INTRODUCTION

controlled. This is especially relevant in the Iranian case, as social networking sites are facilitating communications between Iranians, and between Iranians and the global community, despite extensive efforts by domestic authorities to impede access to these platforms
through filtering and throttling internet speeds.5

While social
networking sites are
creating new modes
of communication
that potentially
foster social and
political change, key
questions remain
over what role these
platforms played,
and are playing, in
the democratization
and political reform
efforts in Iran and
across the Middle
East.

Although Facebook has been blocked in Iran since 20096—accessible only
with illegal circumvention tools—this has done little to thwart its popularity. While there is no available data on the number of Iranian Facebook
users, social media and social networking sites in general have been
avidly embraced by a broad spectrum of Iranian society—from the young
cyber-savvy majority to Iran’s political and religious elites. On a policy
level, there are conflicting perspectives regarding the state’s position on
social media use, as reflected in contradictory comments from officials.
The recent uptick of high-profile political officials and ministers maintaining active Facebook and Twitter accounts highlights the inherent contradictions and paradoxes of the regime’s stance on social media.7

It also demonstrates the complexity and dynamics of online
communications policies and culture in Iran more broadly. The dramatic
rise of internet and social media usage in Iran since the early 2000s
has reconfigured communication and information flows not only among
Iranian citizens but also between citizens and elites. While utilizing social
media and social networking sites to carry messages to mass audiences,
authorities have at the same time have sought to curb access to these
platforms in an effort to quell possible anti-government citizen activism.
This was especially evident in the post-2009 context, when authorities
cracked down on social networking sites and bloggers, and intesified its filtering and
blocking of websites deemed to promote social and political unrest.
Yet beyond the dominant focus on social media use in the political context, it is equally
important to look at social media within the broader Iranian media ecology, as well as to
get a closer read on how Iranians use and re-purpose these platforms under particular
social conditions.

5 Along with introducing a cap on highspeed broadband for residential internet
connections in 2006, authorities often
slow connection speeds as a form of
censorship. See Collin Anderson, “Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling
as a Mechanism of Censorship in Iran,”
arXiv, June 18, 2013.
6 Facebook was initially filtered in Iran
in 2008 and then briefly removed in
early 2009. During the 2009 presidential election campaigns, Facebook

was filtered for three days (May 23-26,
2009) and has been filtered since June
12, 2009. See “Iran’s Facebook Access
Restored,” BBC Persian, May 26, 2009.

23, 2013. “Facebook is an espionage
site, played a role in the 2009 unrests,”
BBC Persian, December 9, 2013.

7 In many cases some of Iranian
officials have commented that Facebook
is not illegal and filtering might be
removed but in response other officials
have rejected these statements. See:
“Negotiation about removing Facebook
filtering in Iran, criticized by members
of Parliament,” BBC Persian, November
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INTRODUCTION

This report, based on an online survey of Iranian Facebook users, contributes to a small
but growing body of scholarship on social and new media use in Iran. Our findings offer new
insights into the Iranian Facebook ecosystem, including patterns of Facebook usage among
Iranians, why and how Iranians are using Facebook, what types of content they are sharing,
as well as perceptions of privacy and security associated with using Facebook. In addition, the
survey addresses the key question of whether Facebook is being used as a tool for political
engagement and civic activism among Iranian internet users, as initial assessments suggested.

Additional Research on Social Media Usage in Iran
Morteza Erfanian et al., “Iranian
Students and Social Networking
Sites: Prevalence and Pattern of
Usage.” 2nd World Conference on
Educational Technology Research, 83
(2013), 44–46.
Hojjat A. Farahani et al., “Examining mental health indices in students
using Facebook in Iran,” World Conference on Educational Technology
Research. 28 (2011), 811–814.
Younes Nouri Moradabadi et al,
“What is the Motivation Student of
Iranians for using Facebook?” 4th
World Conference on Educational
Sciences, February 2012, Barcelona,
Spain, 46(2012), 5192–5195.

Elahe Shabani et al., Motivations,
Concerns, and Strategies of Facebook
Users in Iran, (Rochester, NY: Social
Science Research Network, 2013).
Magdalena Wojcieszak and Briar
Smith. “Will Politics Be Tweeted?
New Media Use by Iranian Youth in
2011,” New Media & Society, March
2013.
Magdalena Wojcieszak and Briar
Smith. “Finding A Way: How Iranians Reach for News and Information,” Iran Media Program, Center
for Global Communication Studies,
Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania,
2011-2012.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our findings are based on 188 responses to an online survey of Iranian Facebook users
conducted in October and November 2012.
The survey addressed the following areas of inquiry:


ACCESSING FACEBOOK: How Iranians access Facebook, including internet 		
connection speeds, hardware, and use of circumvention tools.



FACEBOOK ACTIVITIES: Why Iranians use Facebook and what are their
primary Facebook activities.



SECURITY AND PRIVACY: Concerns about private information and potential
risks associated with Facebook use.



ADDITIONAL SNS ACTIVITIES: Additional social networking and social
media usage, including blogging.

Few respondents
rely on Facebook
primarily for
political activism:
most use Facebook
to socialize.

Respondents more
often follow than
share content,
particularly materials
related to politics.

Adding nuance to widespread notions about the SNS usage in Iran as a
means for political engagement, our findings show that while Iranians do
indeed use Facebook for social and political activism,8 its main use is as a
vehicle for socializing. This reinforces more recent studies demonstrating
that Iranians use Facebook as a virtual space to socialize, especially with
the opposite sex.9 However respondents also cite accessing news and information unavaible through official channels as one of their main reasons for
using Facebook.
Our research reveals a difference in patterns of content-following and
content-sharing behaviors among Iranian Facebook users: respondents
more often follow rather than share content, particularly politically-related
materials, which may demonstrate the perceived security risks associated
with using Facebook. In light of our data showing that fewer individuals
use Facebook as a means of political engagement, this may also indicate
that that more respondents are passive rather than active Facebook users.
Notably, respondents are least interested in sharing or following religious
content.

8 Only 5% of respondents report that
their main reason for using Facebook
is as a platform for social and political
activist; See Chapter 2, “Facebook Activities,” page 14.

9 Emad Khazraee and Kristene Unsworth, “Social Media: The New Opiate
of the Masses?,” International Review
of Information Ethics 18 (2012): 49–59;
Magdalena Wojcieszak and Briar Smith,

“Will Politics Be Tweeted? New Media
Use by Iranian Youth in 2011,” New Media
& Society (March 25, 2013).
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Most access Facebook
with high-speed
internet from home,
despite the 2006 ban
on residential DSL
broadband.

Respondents use a
number of circumvention tools to access
Facebook, with a large
majority preferring
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).

According to our data, a majority of respondents have managed to bypass
the state’s 2006 ban on high speed broadband for residential internet services.10 A large majority of respondents access Facebook with high-speed
broadband from home, which could indicate a loosened approach among
ISPs toward enforcing this regulation.
Our findings also show that survey respondents use a variety of circumvention tools to access Facebook. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are overwhelmingly the most popular solution. Younger demographics are familiar
with a more diverse set of tools in comparison to older generation, especially those requiring more technical skills. Despite being illegal, there is
no clear consensus on the security of using these tools: the sample was
almost evenly divided between whether these tools are secure, not secure,
or “neither.”

Despite security
concerns, most
respondents spend a
considerable amount
of time on Facebook.

Respondents have major concerns about security and privacy in the Facebook environment and are not very trusting of others in general, according
to our data. A majority of survey participants report that they believe that
using Facebook could pose risks to their security, and to their job prospects and reputation. Nevertheless, despite security concerns and obstacles accessing Facebook (e.g. filtering and slow internet connections),
results reveal that respondents spend a considerable amount of time on
Facebook on a daily and weekly basis.

Female respondents
are less concerned
than males about
posting photos on
Facebook in which
they are engaged in
illegal, taboo, or
impolite activities.

In addition, our data reveal both generational and gender differences in
Facebook usage among respondents. It is not surprising that younger
survey participants (ages 20-25) are more fluent in digital technology use
than older respondents. Younger users, however, prefer to use Facebook
for sharing personal ideas and opinions, and are less interested in sharing
and following political content than older age groups surveyed. Younger
respondents are also are less concerned about possible security risks
and professional consequences associated with using Facebook than older
respondents.
According to our research, females more often share content related to
cultural issues, domestic news and events, societal/civic issues, gender, and
the environment than male respondents. Males tend to share more content

10 In 2006, authorities introduced a cap
on broadband speeds faster than 128
kbps for residential internet services.
Faster internet connections are available
for commercial users, and at universi-

ties and internet cafes. However, in the
past home users often bypassed these
restrictions by obtaining certifications
for high-speed internet from friends
or business associates. More recently,

there is evidence that ISPs may no longer
be enforcing the 2006 decree.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Most respondents are
active on at least two
other social networking sites, and about
two thirds report that
they maintained a blog
at some point.

related to the economy, science/IT, and sports. However, female and male
respondents share content on domestic politics, foreign affairs, international
politics, and religion with similar frequency. Survey results also demonstrate
that female respondents are less concerned than male respondents about
posting photos on Facebook in which they are engaged in activities that could
be considered illegal or impolite (such as drinking alcohol or dancing)
In addition, our survey results suggest that social networking sites and
social media are very popular among respondents: a majority are active on
at least two other social networking sites besides Facebook, and about two
thirds report that they maintained a blog at some point. Younger respondents more actively use social media, according to our data.
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SURVEY SAMPLE
Our sample consists of 188 Iranian Facebook users,11 a large majority of which (85%) have
been using Facebook for more than two years. This indicates that most survey respondents
were likely using Facebook during the 2009 election.12



A majority of the sample is comprised of respondents younger than age 30. Most hold
at least a bachelor’s degree. Roughly a third is female and two thirds male.

Figure 1: Age Group of Respondents
30-39

25-29

18-24

40-49

34% 38%

21%

6%

50-64

3%

Figure 2: Respondents’ Education Level

1% Less than high school
9% Graduated high school
13% Some college
38% Undergraduate degree
35% Master’s degree
5% PhD or equivalent

Figure 3: Respondents’ Gender

Female

41.5%

11 There were 129 fully completed
questionnaires and 59 partially
completed questionnaires (completion
rate 69%).

Male

58.5%

12 The online surveys were
completed between October and
November 2012. A link to the Persianlanguage survey was distributed using
Facebook’s advertising system, as

well as by using additional snowball
sampling methods to spread the link
on Facebook (for more information on
survey methods, see Annex).
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1. ACCESSING FACEBOOK
1.1 Internet connections, hardware, and access locations
Iran’s notoriously slow internet speeds are a major impediment to accessing Facebook and
other sites with multi-media or media-rich content. Along with a 2006 ban on high-speed
broadband for residential internet services,13 authorities often throttle web traffic as a
means of censoring and blocking access to internet content, as was the case during the
2009 and 2013 presidential elections in Iran.14 Hence, our survey asked respondents what
types of internet connection speeds and hardware they typically use to access Facebook,
as a means of understanding how survey participants contend with basic technological
barriers to accessing the social networking site.

A majority of respondents report connecting to
Facebook with high-speed broadband from
home, which indicates that these users
have secured fast connections despite the
state’s 2006 ban on broadband DSL for
residential internet services. In addition, most
respondents report using personal laptops or
mobile phones to access Facebook.

KEY
FINDINGS:



Connection types and speeds

Our data show that the most common internet connection used by participants is high speed
broadband over 128 kbps, followed by WiMAX connections, and slower broadband up to 128
kbps, respectively. No one surveyed uses a dial-up connection. It appears that WiMax is
very well-received among respondents, which shows the potential growth of satellite-based
wireless technologies in Iran.

13 Collin Anderson, “Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism
of Censorship in Iran,” arXiv, June 18,
2013.

14 Anderson, “Dimming the Internet.”
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ACCESSING FACEBOOK

Figure 4: Internet Connections

Broadband
(DSL/Cable – faster
than 128 kbps)

Broadband (DSL/Cable
- speed level up to 128
kbps)

63%

20%

17%

0%
Dial up

WiMax



Hardware

Respondents most often use personal computers to access Facebook. Mobile data plans
are not very common or affordable in Iran and their connection speeds are not very
fast; therefore, many Facebook users inside Iran tend to use mobile phones with Wi-Fi
connections.

Figure 5: Device Used to Access Facebook

Mobile phone
Personal
computer

97%
97%

Tablet

33%

16%
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ACCESSING FACEBOOK



Access locations

Most respondents access Facebook from home, which is not surprising given that
Facebook is blocked and accessible only with illegal circumvention tools. Although fewer report accessing Facebook in public spaces, the percentage of respondents who use
Facebook at work is high, with roughly 40% saying they access Facebook from their workplace. This is likely due to the fact that businesses often have high-speed DSL connections.
The least number of respondents report accessing Facebook at internet cafes, which may
reflect the increased scrunity and regulations under which internet cafes operate.15

Figure 6: Locations Used to Access Facebook

home

92%
school

work

42%
via mobile
phone

30%

15 “The Regulations and Conditions
of Computer Information Networks,”
Approved by the SCRC 12/9/2001, http://
goo.gl/sZAwT; For specifications related
to internet cafes, see Internet Service
Regulations at: http://www.cyberpolice.

18%

21%
another
person’s
home

9%

internet
café

public
library

4%
2%
other

ir/page/3031, and Cyber Police Directive
for Internet Cafes at: http://www.cyberpolice.ir/page/11631.
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1.2 Circumvention Tools
In addition to slow internet speeds, internet filtering is a key obstacle to accessing Facebook
inside Iran. With Facebook blocked since 2009, domestic users can access the site only by
relying on illegal circumvention. Despite criminal penalties for using these tools, Iranians
frequently rely on circumvention technologies to bypass the state’s internet filter and access
banned web content, including Facebook.16

KEY
FINDINGS:

Respondents report using three to four types of circumvention
tools to access Facebook. The overwhelming preference is for
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), although respondents also
report relying frequently on other platforms, such as FreeGate,
Ultrasurf, Tor and Socks. There is no strong consensus among
respondents regarding the security risks of using circumvention
tools. Although these tools are illegal, most respondents check
their Facebook acounts several times a day and spend more than
10 hours a week on Facebook.

According to our data:
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are by far the most popular circumvention tool used
to access Facebook, used by nearly 8 out of 10 respondents.
More than half of participants report having also used Freegate and Ultrasurf to
access Facebook, respectively.

16 The 2009 Computer Crime Law specifies
criminal penalties for accessing filtered or
blocked content through the use of illegal
circumvention tools. See: Computer Crimes
Law, in Farsi, at: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/
show/135717. See also, Ameneh Dehshiri,
“Legality of Bypassing Internet Filtering in

Iran,” CGCS Media Wire, Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg
School for Communication, University of
Pennsylvania, http://cgcsblog.asc.upenn.
edu/2013/06/10/legality-of-bypassing-internet-filtering-in-iran/.
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Figure 7: Most Popular Circumvention Tools
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VPNs are most popular among respondents over age 40. This may be due to the fact
that VPNs are easier to use, while tools like
Freegate and Ultrasurf require more technical
expertise.

Socks is more often used by respondents
younger than age 25 as compared to other
age groups surveyed. Again, this may be
due to the higher digital literacy level among
younger respondents.

Figure 8: Frequency of Circumvention Tool Usage (by age group)

<25

25-29

30-39

>40

VPN

72%

82%

74%

98%

Freegate

59%

59%

55%

25%

Ultrasurf

44%

61%

59%

17%

Socks

41%

29%

17%

8%

Tor

28%

41%

45%

8%
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ACCESSING FACEBOOK

We also asked respondents about their perceptions of security risks associated with using
circumvention tools.

According to our data:

Figure 9: Security of Circumvention Tools

There is no strong consensus among respondents
regarding the risks of using
circumvention tools. The
sample was nearly evenly
split between those who believe these tools are secure,
not secure, and those who
said “neither.”

Very secure/
secure

Very insecure/
insecure

31%

32%

38%

Neither

Figure 10: Frequency of Checking Facebook
Despite that these tools are
illegal, a majority of respondents check their accounts
several times a day.

27%

Less often

About once a day

2%

Every few weeks

2%

6%

3-5 days a week

4%

59%

1-2 days a week

Several times a day

Figure 11: Time Spent (per week) on Facebook
Most respondents spend
more than 10 hours a week
on Facebook.
Up to
60 minutes

17%

32%

18%
1-3 hours

More than
10 hours

19%
15%

5-10 hours

3-5 hours
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2. FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES
Given the regulatory and technological restrictions to accessing Facebook in Iran, our
survey sought to better understand the broader Facebook environment among Iranian
users, and address questions regarding what motivates Iranians to use the social media
site, what their primary Facebook activities are, as well as patterns of liking, following,
commenting on, and sharing content.

2.1 Primary Reasons for Using Facebook
In an effort to assess how Facebook is being utilized—including what role, if any, Facebook
plays as a platform for political activism in Iran—our survey asked respondents about their
main reasons for using Facebook.

KEY
FINDINGS:

Respondents mainly use Facebook to communicate
with friends and family, to access alternative news
and information, and for entertainment purposes,
respectively. A smaller percentage of those surveyed
report using Facebook as a platform for social and
political activism. This indicates that while users do
indeed rely on Facebook to access information and
for political communication, a larger majority use the
social networking site to socialize.

According to our data:
Staying in touch with friends and family is the top reason for using Facebook, cited by six
out of ten survey respondents. 						
Accessing news and information not available through official media outlets is the
second-most popular reason for using Facebook, cited by roughly 15% of our sample.
Entertainment ranks third among the top reasons for using Facebook, according to more
than 10% of respondents surveyed.						
Only 5% report relying on Facebook to promote social and political activism as their main
reason for using the social media site.

LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 14

FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES

Figure 12: Primary Reason for Using Facebook

Staying in touch
with friends and
family

60%

Learning about news and
information unavailable
through official channels

16%
11%

For entertainment
(killing time)
As a way to contribute
to social and political
activism

Other

Professional
networking

5%
3%
3%

Because
everyone has
a Facebook account

1%

Finding friends

1%

Gaming

1%

As a way to meet
potential romantic
partners

0%
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FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES

2.2 Liking, commenting, following and sharing
Our survey also asked respondents more detailed questions about their Facebook activities in
order to gauge levels of participation and interactivity among users, as well as to investigate
patterns of liking, commenting on, following and sharing content.

KEY
FINDINGS:

Most respondents appear to be “passive” Facebook users:
they tend to follow more often than share content, and
“like” more often than comment on others’ posts. In
addition, a majority share more personal content than
materials related to domestic and international politics
and news. Respondents are least interested in sharing
and following religious content compared to other types
of materials.

According to our data:
“Liking” and commenting on their friends’ posts are among respondents’ most popular
Facebook activities.
Respondents less frequently update their own status or share links, photos, or videos, respectively.
Only a small percentage of respondents engage in more participatory activities, such as
moderating groups or creating events on Facebook.
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FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES

Figure 13: Respondents’ Primary Facebook Activities

92%

85%

liking a
post or
link

posting
comments
on a friend’s
posts

60%
updating

one’s own
status

60%

sending a
message
to a friend
or a group
of friends

59%

responding
to a friend
request

53%
sharing
links

50%
sharing
photos

creating and/
or responding
to events and
invitations

48%
participating in
and/or
moderating
groups or
posts

15%

9%

sharing
videos
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FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES

Our research also reveals interesting patterns in content-following and content-sharing
behaviors among respondents.

According to our survey:
Respondents more frequently share content related to personal thoughts and opinions
compared to any other types of materials.
Respondents more often follow than share content in general. This is particularly true
for materials related to domestic news and politics, the economy, foreign affairs and
international politics.
There is little difference in the frequency of following and sharing habits on cultural,
community, professional issues and religion, respectively.17
Religion is the least-frequently followed and shared topic among survey respondents.18

Figure 14: Frequency of Following and Sharing Content
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66%

45%
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32%
33%

27%

Everyday life

32%
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17 Within a 3 percentage-point range.
18 This demonstrates a difference
between the interests of Iranian social
network users and those in Middle
Eastern countries. According to a recent

20%

34%

International
politics

study published by Pew Global Attitude
Project more than 60% of SNS users in
Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia share content
about religion. See: Andrew Kohut et
al., Social Networking Popular Across
Globe: Arab Publics Most Likely to Express

46%
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27%
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20%
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30%

School, work.
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55%

44%
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29%

57%

Foreign affairs

17%
8%
Health

9%
7%
Religion

Political Views Online (Pew Research
Center Global Attitudes Project, 2012).
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Our findings also reveal some notable patterns in content-sharing behaviors between male
and female respondents.

According to our results:
Female and male respondents share content with similar frequency19 in six of the 17
categories surveyed, including: personal issues, domestic politics, work/professional
issues, community, foreign affairs, international politics, religion, and health, respectively.
Females more often share content related to cultural issues, domestic news and events,
societal/civic issues, gender, and the environment.
Males tend to share more content related to the economy, science/IT, and sports.

Figure 15: Frequency of Topics Shared (by gender)
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19 Within a 3 percentage-point range.
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Likewise, sharing behaviors differ according to the respondents’ age.
Younger respondents (ages 25 or younger) tend to share their personal thoughts and
opinions more frequently than all other age groups.
Figure 16: Frequency of Sharing Personal Content (by age)
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Younger respondents also share more news about about religion than other users.

Figure 17: Frequency of Sharing Religious Content (by age)
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Respondents ages 30-39 tend to share more domestic news content than other
age groups surveyed.

Figure 18: Frequency of Domestic News Content (by age)
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3. TRUST, PRIVACY AND SECURITY
Social networking sites constantly produce digital traces of a users’ activities. Moreover,
many social media users provide personal information on their profile pages which make
them easily identifiable. One major concern for SNS users around the world is to what extent
this may violate their privacy and what security risks this may entail—a concern heightened
for SNS users living in media-restrictive environments in which access to these platforms is
banned or limited.

3.1 Trust in Online Networks
The issue of trust within social networks has become a key area of inquiry for scholars
looking to measure the strength of online relationships and to understand the differences
between online and offline social networks in general. Recent studies suggest that SNS
users are more trusting of other people compared to non SNS-users.20 The issue of trust
among Iranian users is more complicated due to Facebook being prohibited. Hence, in our
survey we asked participants whether or not people, in general, can be trusted.21

KEY
FINDINGS:

Survey participants are not very trusting of
people they do not know, yet most say they
“friend” people they have never met or have
only met once. Younger respondents are the
least trusting group compared to other groups
in this survey.

20 Keith Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites
and Our Lives (Pew Research Center’s Internet &
American Life Project, 2011).

21 The question of trust in people is drawn from
the Pew SNS and Facebook Survey 2010, See:
Keith Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites and
Our Lives (Pew Research Center’s Internet &
American Life Project, 2011).
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According to our data:
Respondents are not very trusting in general, with a majority reporting that “you can’t be
too careful” or “it depends.”22
Younger respondents (ages 25 or younger) are the least-trusting group in comparison to
other age groups surveyed.

Figure 19: Trust in People

56%
32%
11%
Most people
can be trusted

You can’t be
too careful

It depends

2%
Don’t
know

At the same time, a vast majority reported they have Facebook friends who they have never
met or have only met once. Although this seems like contradictory data, it appears that
respondents may consider other contextual cues to decide about the trustworthiness of
other people, as nearly one third (31%) indicated that trusting other people depends on
other factors.23

22 In comparison, 45% of American SNS users
“agree that most people can be trusted,” Hampton
et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, p. 33.
23 In contrast, just 3% of the respondents in the US
indicated trusting other people depends on other
factors, Hampton et al., p. 33.
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3.2 Facebook Privacy
We also asked respondents about how satisfied they are with Facebook’s privacy options,
as well as what specific privacy settings they use to protect their Facebook activities and
profile from the general public and/or from members within their own friend network.

KEY
FINDINGS:

Just one third of respondents say they are satisfied
with Facebook’s privacy options and policies. A
majority of survey participants report setting
their profile visibility on “private” so that only
their friends can see their profiles. More than half
of respondents with “private” settings also apply
limits on what certain friends can see.

According to our data:
Only a small percentage of respondents use completely public Facebook privacy settings.
Six out of ten respondents set their accounts on private, allowing only those in their friend
networks to access their profiles.
Roughly a quarter of respondents use “partially private” settings that allow a broader
network of Facebook friends to access to their account profiles.
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Figure 20: Facebook Profile Privacy Settings
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In addition, our data shows that respondents are reluctant to publicly reveal information
about a range of personal information, including: their relationships and family members,
their friend networks, their religion, and their political affiliation.

Figure 21: Access to Profile Information

78%

75%

55%
49%
43%
33%

31%
17%

Personal
photo
showing
your face

Real
name

Work and
education

Birth
date

Email

Relationship
and family

List of
friends

13%

11%

Your
Political Phone
religion affiliation number
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We also asked participants about what they consider when posting pictures of themseleves
on Facebook.

Survey results show:
Only a small percentage of female respondents (15%) are concerned about whether their
hijab is correct in the photos they publish on Facebook.
A majority of female respondents are, however, concerned about posting photos in which
they are engaged in activities considered culturally taboo or illegal (for instance, socializing
with friends of opposite sex, drinking alchohol, dancing).
Male respondents are more conservative than females in this regard, with nearly eight
out of ten males surveyed saying that they avoid posting photos in which they are depicted
doing something considered culturally taboo or illegal.

Figure 22: Considerations When Posting Photos (by gender)
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3.3 Security Concerns
Given that Facebook is blocked in Iran and only accessible with the use of illegal circumvention tools, our survey sought to understand the perception among respondents regarding
the security risks associated with using Facebook.

KEY
FINDINGS:

A majority of respondents believe using
Facebook could risk their security to some
extent and may pose risks to their job
prospects and reputation. Nearly half say they
are “somewhat familiar” with stories about
Facebook causing security threats to users.

According to our data:
More than 65% of respondents surveyed believe it that using Facebook could pose some
risks to their job prospects and reputation.
Respondents also reported being familiar with security issues through the personal
experiences of their friends and acquaintances and through international news sources,
respectively.
Facebook users with higher education levels are more concerned about the potential
impact Facebook could have on their job prospects.24

24 A Mann-Whitney test indicated that
the risk of Facebook use for someone’s
job prospect was perceived greater
by the participants who has a higher
education degree than among less
educated participants (U = 4905, N=302,
p = .001).
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Figure 23: Perception of Risks of Facebook Usage on Job Prospects and Reputation
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4. ADDITIONAL SNS ACTIVITIES
In an effort to better understand the broader social networking environment in Iran, our
survey asked respondents about other platforms they use in addition to Facebook.

KEY
FINDINGS:

A majority of respondents are also active on at least
two other Social Networking Sites. Google+ is by
far the most popular social networking platform,
followed by Twitter and LinkedIn. In addition, well
over half of respondents say they have had their
own blog.

Our survey results show:
Facebook was listed as the sole social networking platform by just 17% of respondents.
Nearly two-thirds of respondents use Google+, while roughly 30% use Twitter and
LinkedIn, respectively.
About a fifth of respondents (17%) have a profile on Orkut, which was one of the first social
networking sites in Iran, launched in 2004.25

25 In January 2005, the service was filtered inside Iran, which sparked debates
between members of the reformist government and the judiciary. See “Judiciary

filtered PersianBlog and Orkut.” BBC
Persian, January 9, 2005.

LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 28

ADDITIONAL SNS ACTIVITY

Figure 24: Additional SNS Usage Among Respondents
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Our survey results also confirm findings from other scholars about the popularity of blogging among Iranians.30

About two thirds of survey respondents (61%) confirmed that they have managed their
own online journal or blog.31
Generally, blogging is more popular among the younger respondents, with more than
69% of users younger than age 30 reporting that they have managed their own blog.

These findings coincide with the Iran Media Program’s survey conducted among young
internet users in Iran which showed that 54% of respondents wrote their own blog.32

30 Nasrin Alavi, We Are Iran: The Persian
Blogs (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press,
2005); Elizabeth M. Bucar and Roja
Fazaeli, “Free Speech in Weblogistan?
The Offline Consequences of Online
Communication,” International Journal
of Middle East Studies 40, no. 03 (2008):
403–419; Philip Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; John
Kelly and Bruce Etling, “Mapping Iran’s
Online Public: Politics and Culture in the
Persian Blogosphere,” Berkman Center,
2008; Antony Loewenstein, The Blogging
Revolution (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne Uni-

versity Press, 2008); Annabelle Sreberny
and Gholam Khiabany, Blogistan: The
Internet and Politics in Iran (New York: I.
B. Tauris, 2010).
31 In contrast, in the US as of 2010, 14%
of internet users reported having ever
managed their own online journal or
blog. See Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, 64.

migrated to Facebook and other SNSs to
post and share content. See, Laurent Giacobino et al, “Whither Blogestan: Evaluating Shifts in Persian Cyberspace,”
Iran Media Program, Center for Global
Communication Studies, Annenberg
School for Communication, University of
Pennsylvania, March 2014.

32 This trend may also mirror other
examinations of Iranian bloggers which
demonstrate how many bloggers have
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CONCLUSION
The 2009 election in Iran and the Arab Spring that followed put a spotlight on the democratizing
potential of social media and social networking sites, particularly in societies in which communication flows are restricted by state authorities. Scholars, policy makers and media outlets at
the time made hopeful assertions about the potential for these technologies to mobilize civic activism and drive social and political change in the Middle East. However, it is increasingly clear
that a more nuanced understanding of how social media are used in specific cultural contexts is
necessary to substantiate early claims about their powers of political efficacy.
Our findings indicate that Iranians rely on Facebook primarily to communicate with friends
and family and only a small percentage use Facebook for political purposes. As such, it appears that Facebook functions as an alternative or quasi “public space” where social norms
and codes of conduct for public life are less restrictive.
In addition, our research demonstrates that Iranian Facebook users are adept at circumventing technical restrictions that impede access to the social networking site. That most
respondents in our survey report accessing Facebook with high-speed broadband from
home indicates that the state’s restrictions on faster internet speeds for residential services is no longer enforced by ISPs, perhaps in keeping with market demands. Likewise,
our data confirms the widespread use of VPNs as the circumvention tool of choice among
Iranian Facebook users, particularly among older, less tech-savvy respondents. Yet even
with high-speed internet, the use of circumvention tools considerably reduces connection
speeds; therefore, Iranian Facebook users have trouble consuming and sharing the rich
multimedia content offered on Facebook.
Our research indicates that while respondents frequently use Facebook, most appear to
be passive rather than active users, with a majority preferring to follow rather than share
content, especially politically oriented materials. In contrast, there is less disparity in following and sharing behaviors with regard to content about personal, cultural, and societal
issues. This may indicate that Iranian Facebook users are less comfortable sharing political
content given that certain kinds of political expression are heavily disincentivized. Notably,
our research shows that Iranians are less interested in sharing content about religion than
most SNS users in the Middle East, which highlights some national and socio-political differences in SNS use across the region.
Our data also demonstrate the complexity of security-related issues with regard to the use of
Facebook and circumvention tools in Iran. While respondents express concerns about Facebook’s security and privacy settings, they do not appear to be overly concerned about the
security risks of using circumvention tools—which is reflective of how commonplace the use of
these tools to access blocked social media sites have become. It is also indicative of how many
Iranians are attracted to social networking sites like Facebook as platforms for self-expression
and alternative sources of information despite the risks it might entail.
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ANNEX: DATA COLLECTION
AND METHODOLOGY
This study is designed based on a previous qualitative study of Facebook use among Iranians. In the former study, we first conducted a series of qualitative interviews and a content
analysis of activities of Iranian Facebook users to better understand the specific issues of
SNS use among Iranians. Findings of the assessment were used to design the online survey
of Iranian Facebook users for this current study.
In effort to reach the target population, a link to a Persian-language survey on Facebook
was distributed via Facebook’s advertisement system. However, this method proved challenging, as Facebook’s advertisement system targets users based on information such as
their location and language, yet neither of these options are available in Facebook’s advertisement system for the Iranian or Persian language.
We therefore developed strategies to overcome the limitation of this feature in order to
target Iranian users inside Iran. Since access to Facebook requires circumvention tools to
bypass filtering using proxy servers outside Iran, we decided to use proxy servers’ locations
for targeting users inside Iran. A former study shows that the majority of proxy servers exit
through the United States, Germany, the UK, Netherlands, France, Canada or Sweden. We
also used the “interests targeting” feature of Facebook advertising which targets users
based on users’ profile content and onsite connections. Therefore, we added a group of
keywords both in English and Persian such as Iran, Persian, Farsi, the name of major cities
in Iran, and popular sports clubs as target interests. In order to avoid a biased sampling,
we did not use controversial keywords or political terms. According to Facebook’s advertisement system, the size of potential audience for our advertisement campaign reached to
2,284,840 users. To maximize the outreach of the survey we also used snowball sampling to
spread the link to the survey on Facebook.
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